Re: Library Design, the script kiddie's nightmare.



f0dder,

Now here are the next problems with your assertion about the effects of
an unhandled exception in either Unix or Windows.

1. Both OS versions are drammatically different yet you assert that
they have the identical security leak.

2. You are asserting that ANY buffer overflow will break the security
of two entirely different OS versions.

There is a method of dealing with a problem of this type, report this
major security flaw to the respective OS vendors and see if they agree
with you. i would not hold my breath waiting

Can't you read? Quoting myself, with some emphasis added:

"it's common to have *non-root* access to a unix box." - that's what you get
from a shell provider.

Same question for someone who seems to think they are new found Unix
expert, are you claiming that allowing "root" access is not a security
problem ? Many Unix hacks of old were based on gaining "root" access
and this will be of course from first having "non root" access first.

"If a "sudo" application (ie, privilegeded binary that can be run by
non-root) has a buffer overflow, a non-root user can privilege escalate to
root. This is bad. And that's the kind of stuff your GetCL could cause."

GetCL simply does not run on Unix so this is clearly nonsense. Windows
API functions do NOT run on a native Unix system. If you dont know
things like this you need to go back and learn them.

If you are confusing things as basic as code compatibility across two
entirely different native operating systems you need to give up
lecturing others and start learning these basic distinctions.

Lack of research seems to be a common method in your approach, the
solution to someone using the old algo where there is a high chance of
too much data being pointed at it is contained in EXAMPL10\STEXP\SE.ASM
within the masm32 Project.

This is the RIGHT WAY to deal with a component algorithm of this type,
forget padding the code full of junk that restricts the user.

Regards,

hutch at movsd dot com

.



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