Re: compile+link Fujitsu Linux
- From: Richard <riplin@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2008 20:13:38 -0800 (PST)
Robert wrote:
On Wed, 6 Feb 2008 00:19:14 -0800 (PST), Richard <riplin@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Feb 6, 7:01 pm, Robert <n...@xxxxxx> wrote:
Well, no it doesn't do that. Not even close. But you still haven't
explained how your mechanism is 'better'. Given equal slackness in
permissions and such and users can access compilers then how is a
library any different ? Tools can push and pull stuff out of
libraries.
My security is better because it does not depend on file system permissions. It doesn't
depend on application code, either.
You claimed that your mechanism of having all the programs in one
library was better. That is was more reliable, more secure, easier to
deploy and faster.
It may be insignificantly faster in the CALL, but is slower on
startup. Deployment would only be 'easier' if you don't bother to
test. Reliability is worse because a 'missing file' stops the whole
application. Now you simply change the subject to something that is
completely independent of whether it uses libraries or individual
programs.
The goal of security is to prevent unauthorized people from seeing or changing certain
data. I do that by protecting the DATA; you do it by preventing them from running
programs.
As an analogy, suppose we are parents who want to prevent our kids from watching sex
movies on TV. You would do it by locking up the remote control, which is easily bypassed
with a universal remote. I would do it by telling the cable box to play the movies only
for designated users.
You claimed that your way was superior and the best that you have come
up with is 'less ugly'.
Simpler deployment, can be checked by auditing tools, faster loading, more reliable
because mid-run aborts due to missing program are impossible.
These are mere assertions. Having a script to do ZIP up everything is
just as simple as having a list for ld. Actually the ZIP list can be
*.so, so that is simpler and more reliable because it collects
everything and not just what is in the list of -ls. On unzipping it
won't remove a file that failed to be included in zip, while a library
short of one program will make that unavailable.
'Simple' is 'what you are used to'. It may be simpler for you because
you already have it all set up. My way is simpler for me because I
have mine set up. You are attempting to claim some sort of 'global
universal truth' for your assertions (as usual).
As I say, if you don't test what you are sending out then it _will_ be
less reliable.
I use auditing tools, too. Programs COPY in a 'version.ws' that is
recreated each run of make so that I can check that a deployment to a
site has resulted in the correct versions of all programs, and this
_would_ pick up if anything is missing.
Your assertion that yours is 'more reliable' is complete nonsense.
Mine is 100% and you have previously stated that your stuff goes
missing.
Your claim about faster loading is also nonsense. Your startup will
take longer because you also load the library(s). I load on demand and
only load the one that are actually used. The startup time difference
may be noticable, the load of an individual program is not.
What makes you think that users have write access to the program
directory ? _I_ can drop in another program.
If they have read access, they can copy your whole directory structure to their home
directory, change permissions all they want, and run their local copy to find out the
boss' salary.
Well, actually, no they couldn't. I already told you that particular
programs can be set to be owned by the application administrator with
a group id of the trusted group and permissions of 640. It is only if
you are a member of the trusted group that give read access to run (or
copy) that program. Users can be members of several groups so access
can be very granular. Users not a member of that group will get a
'program not found' if they try to select it from the menu.
I assumed the files had world read permission. You stopped that approach.
So, you would concede then that I have described a mechanism that
would not be able to be used by your system the way that you have it
and that this mechanism does protect the programs.
My system? I'd like to take credit for inventing Unix and ELF, but I believe Thompson and
Ritchie did it first.
I was not referring to your _Operating_System_ but to your system of
assembling programs.
Security belongs in the called program, not the menu program. A user could write his own
program that calls yours.
Which is not an advantage for your library because he could call that
too.
So? The called program issues an Unauthorized message and exits.
And why do you think that "A user could write his own program that
calls yours." and have it work ?
Instead of addressing your claimed superiority you merely ramble on
about something else entirely unrelated, and straw-men, in the hope
that it may bamboozle. Perhaps that is your normal 'arguing' skills,
you win if they give up so it doesn't matter what the content is.
It IS relevant to you, since your security depends on the Unix file system. If I can
change a group member's (hidden) profile or shell login, I can get his group permission,
even though I don't belong to the group. His script could copy the main menu (or ksh) to
my home, give it world execute and setgroupid. Next time I run it, I'm in the privileged
group.
Well they can't.
I don't have 30,000 developers trying to take me down. The level of
security is entirely appropriate for the types of business and clients
that I look after.
.
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