Re: [EGN] Re: turing completeness
From: Kenneth Chiu (chiuk_at_cs.indiana.edu)
Date: 02/07/04
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Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2004 00:04:41 +0000 (UTC)
In article <4024006B.161DB43C@Sonnack.com>,
Programmer Dude <Chris@Sonnack.com> wrote:
>Thomas Stegen CES2000 wrote:
>
>>>> Theoretically, /I/ don't care about atoms OR space. I'm a
>>>> Platonist. ;-)
>>>
>>> The math is the reality, eh? (-:
>>>
>>> Too bad it's OT, because I'm an Aristotle-ist, and it would be fun
>>> to debate the issue. I must admit, Platonists do have the edge
>>> when it comes to many-worlds theories....
>>
>> We could make it on topic by discussing what a computer can
>> compute (or if you can program a computer to do any task that
>> for example a human can). I am going to try anyways.
>
>Good luck! I think it's going to be difficult!!
>
>> First of, I am a sort of a Platonist. I do not quite believe
>> in that our observable world is just a reflection of the real
>> world without some qualification. I believe (or want to be
>> true at least) that everything in the universe can be described
>> perfectly by mathematics.
>
>You do say, "sort of", so you are probably aware that Platonists
>believe the only reality is the numbers, and the real world is just
>an (okay, here's sort of a computer-ish bit) "instance" of that
>mathematics.
>
>(FWIW, I just have a gut sense that mathematics is a purified
>abstraction of the (messy) real world, rather than than the world
>being a crude instance of the pure math.)
>
>
>> Take AI for example. I think it is possible (at least in theory)
>> to construct some device that acts like a human thinks like a human
>> and for most intents and purposes.
>
>We were talking about this here not long ago. You may recall that
>I don't believe that a mind is "just an engineering problem". I
>think we will someday build a "brain". I doubt it will turn into
>a "mind" when we switch it on (but I could well be wrong).
>
>Just jammin' here.... consider a circle. Mathematically it's perfect.
>In the real world, no such beast as a "true circle" can exist. For
>one thing, the circle itself has no thickness or height. None.
>What if what gives us "mind" from a "brain" involves that perfection?
>It could mean we can no more create a mind than we could create a
>perfect circle. (The fly in my oink is that minds do exist, whereas
>perfect circles do not.... [shrug] or maybe they do, it's just that
>we can't make'm.)
>
>> This does challenge the idea of free will,...
>
>I'm not sure it does. Assume minds exist. Assume free will exists.
>If we do manage to build a mind, that implies we will build something
>with free will. If free will doesn't exist, you can stop worrying
>about it. (-:
>
>Or, maybe that's another reason building a mind isn't possible.
>
>> (maybe an artificial brain needs to be made up of proper brain
>> material, who knows what effects "brain-material-noise" might
>> have on our thinking process)
>
>I do think building a brain is just an engineering problem. After
>all, animals (including us) build them in huge numbers every day.
>If a physical structure *can* be made, *we* can in theory make one.
>
>> It is somhow plausible that the entire universe is in fact a
>> computer simulation of some universe.
>
>I donno about "plausible". I'll take "possible" for $200, though.
>
>> If we make the hypothesis that consciousness occurs because we
>> observe that our actions has an affect on ourself.
>
>(effect) The thread about intelligence ran down without ever really
>addressing the question: "Define consciousness". But I think we all
>sorta, kinda have a sense of "what makes us different from animals"
>(or maybe "different from rocks").
>
>Is there a significant difference between my dog and I? She is
>aware that *some* actions affect her, but seems oblivious to the
>effects of others (e.g. will eat the same sort of mushroom that
>made her very, very sick several times before).
>
>(An oft-cited Gary Larson cartoon is the one showing a huge mammoth
>felled by a single arrow. One cave man says to the other, "Remember
>that spot!")
>
>I guess I need more convincing that consciousness *comes* *from* my
>observing my actions and their effects on me.
>
>> If each entity in the simulated universe is modelled by a state
>> machine or neural network of sufficient complexity they might
>> eventually get into a state where they are aware of how actions
>> will affect them.
>
>An interesting, and even perhaps roughly on-topic, idea. Can a set
>of hardware and software *achieve* self-awareness without it being
>programmed in. Software can certainly be made "aware" of hardware
>by programming now (e.g. Plug n Play).
>
>It almost seems close to the "brain in vat" problem. If we ARE just
>brains in vats being fed information by scientists (or are being used
>as Duracells by machines that have taken over the world :-), is it
>possible to "become aware of The Matrix"? Philosophers have tried
>to find ways to determine the "brain in vat" problem, but I have yet
>to see one that's conclusive.
>
>That *suggests* (but comes nowhere near concluding) that becoming
>self-aware might not be possible.
>
>> If this is true (not that the universe is simulated, but that it
>> can be) then we can create a program which either has or will
>> eventually attain consciousness.
>
>But quite a leap, isn't it. Consider this, oh Platonist [grin].
>
>If the real world is only a crude approximation of the reality of
>the numbers, what physical mechanism can possible hope to fully
>simulate a reality?
But another way to look at it is that the real world is as
perfect as the mathematical world, if the real world is
contemplated in it's full complexity. That is, suppose we
make a "sphere" out of steel. That "sphere" is of course
imperfect. But the "imperfection" results from our choice
to interpret it as a sphere, rather than as a unique
assemblage of atoms that can be completely described only by
enumerating the positions of all the atoms.
In other words, the "sphere" is a perfect representation of
what it is, which is not a sphere at all. It's lack of
sphereness reflects our inability to deal with its full
complexity.
As we simplify the object (by reducing the particle count),
the description we impose on the object approaches the
reality of the object. So, for example, if we consider just
a single electron, I would say that the electron is real,
yet perfect.
>Doesn't a simulation need to have "meta data"?
>It seems that meta data would need to be of the next level of
>reality (the perfect world of numbers, maybe). At the very least,
>it seems the simulating universe would need to be larger than the
>simulated one.
>
>But,... I'm still just jammin'.
>
>
>> I'll stop now, if this is on topic enough for you I will be happy
>> to continue the discussion. :)
>
>Well, I'm pretty promiscuous when it comes to topic.... (-:
>
>--
>|_ CJSonnack <Chris@Sonnack.com> _____________| How's my programming? |
>|_ http://www.Sonnack.com/ ___________________| Call: 1-800-DEV-NULL |
>|_____________________________________________|_______________________|
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