Re: What's the name for this?
From: Edward G. Nilges (spinoza1111_at_yahoo.com)
Date: 05/16/04
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Date: 15 May 2004 21:52:00 -0700
Chris Sonnack <Chris@Sonnack.com> wrote in message news:<40A0FE03.3AB98D5@Sonnack.com>...
> "Edward G. Nilges" wrote:
>
> >>> This site misrepresents Moore.
> >>
> >> Odd,... since he never mentions Moore!
> >
> > "The doctrine (popular in Britain around the turn of the century)"
> > clearly refers to George Edward Moore.
>
> 1. That's YOUR interpretation. The author may agree or not.
The author is clearly a bitter and twisted graduate student at a
land-grant university who is probably as I write face-down in a pool
of vomit. Must I automatically dignify him?
> 2. It may (or may not) misrepresent Intuitionism, not Moore.
>
>
> >> Exactly so. And that commonality is (as I'm sure I said) the
> >> foundation of intuitionism. One can find evidence of this in
> >> diverse societies that developed in isolation from each other
> >> usually derive common moral philosophies.
> >
> > Sorry I misunderstood your views. You are clearly a bit smarter
> > than the [author] which you use as authority. Therefore I suggest
> > you access primary and secondary sources.
>
> 1. I used the cite more as reference than authority. I'm more
> interested in *current* thinking and discussion.
Whose thinking? Whose discussion?
> 2. Primary historic sources are only of passing interest (to me).
> I'm more interested in the conclusions and analysis of
> philosophy than its history or development.
>
All I can say is that your methodology is more typical of the barroom
"philosopher" whose woozy speculations grow more inchoate with each
round. Having done my time among real philosophers, albeit only in the
Middle West of the USA and Princeton, it appears to me that they (even
the most "scientific") are engaged in a dialog with "primary historic
sources".
For example, logical positivism and philosophy of mathematics would
indeed seem to be least interested in the history of philosophy and
its primary texts, from the Republic to der Kritik der Reinen Vernunft
and beyond: yet Korner's Philosophy of Mathematics must needs use
Plato to characterize Bertrand Russell's logicism, and Kant, to
characterize Intuitionism.
Of Korner's three-way taxonomy, only formalism is disconnected from
the history of philosophy and primary sources, and David Hilbert's
view, that mathematics in an uninstantiated game, is perhaps the least
viable for this reason.
> This is why I discarded Kant after reading him long ago. He was
> a (valuable) stepping stone to modern thought, and is only useful
> to me as a historical presense. He's as relevant to modern
> thought as Newton is to modern physics. (Which, in case it's not
> clear, means he is relevant as a piece of a much greater whole.)
>
I must ask what greater whole you apprehend that somehow subsumes Kant
and I must confess to a certain skepticism.
You seem to think that philosophical progress is, or should be, the
same as scientific progress.
Newton's system can be deductively derived, by assuming certain
preconditions, from Einstein's system. But in philosophy, you cannot
deductively derive Kant's system from any modern "system" for several
reasons.
The first is that philosophical "systems" don't exist, only truth
claims and texts.
The second is that Kant showed that deductive and empirical reasoning
methods do not exhaust rationality. Kant's doctrine of the synthetic
apriori is the claim that there are truths as certain as those of
logic and mathematics which unlike those of logic and mathematics are
not part of axiomatic systems, but instead established by a
transcendental dialectic, the condition of whose possibility is
actually prior to logic and mathematics.
Kant and Hegel scorned logic and mathematics as trivial games because
their elegant, but ultimately moronizing, proofs and conclusions are
not representative of pure thought.
Indeed, Kant's work was predictive of the crisis of mathematics of the
1920s represented by the work of Godel.
Good scientists, I suppose, don't need to have a copy of Newton's
Principia on their shelf (although a coworker at Princeton who was a
good technician had a copy of the reprint).
But any philosopher, like Ayn Rand, who apriori refuses to read any
philosopher as Rand scorned Kant, is no philosopher and instead at
best a cult leader like Da Free John or Ba Ba Ram Dass or Charles
Manson.
>
> [big snip]
>
> As you may recall, this all started when I challenged your use
> of Platonism as relevant to programming.
>
> Now that you've had time to chew on it, care to try again?
I have of course addressed this issue long ago. I would have to ask at
this point that you cease being so disruptive. Your behavior probably
discourages lurkers from posting.
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