Hardware/Software Dichotomy and Platonism (Re: expectations being satisfied)
From: Eray Ozkural exa (erayo_at_bilkent.edu.tr)
Date: 05/29/04
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Date: 29 May 2004 06:12:20 -0700
[crossposted to comp.theory due to the philosophical interpretation of
computation in this post, which will be of general interest for theory
of computation]
Hello Neil,
I think I'll have to slightly disagree with you, not in your
observations, but in the metaphysical implications of them, being a
physicalist.
Neil W Rickert <rickert+nn@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message news:<c97v18$8ke$1@usenet.cso.niu.edu>...
> If a program is loaded into memory for execution, then the memory,
> including its current configuration, is physical.
>
> However, the software is not the punch cards; the software is not the
> disk not the disk configuration; the software is not the memory, nor
> the memory configuration. Those are all physical instantiations of
> the software. They are not the software itself.
>
> When the program is loaded into memory from the disk image, there is
> nothing physical that is part of the disk, which is physically
> transported into memory and made part of the physical memory.
>
> The software is abstract. It can have a variety of physical
> instantiations. When we load the program into memory, we create a
> physical instantiation in memory.
Before starting my criticism, let me mention that your above comments
do not entirely make your ontological commitments clear.
Here, you seem to be using "abstract" in the sense of Gödelian
mathematical realism; in other words, Platonism. While I know that
many mathematicians prefer to think of mathematical objects as having
a different kind of existence than the physical, I think this is not a
good way of waving the razor of William of Occam.
The physicalist view of the mind does not necessarily entail the kind
of hardware/software dichotomy which you seem to presuppose in your
above explanation. The software supervenes on the hardware, and is
multiply realizable [!], just as you suggest, but I believe it is not
made of an abstract substance that is independent of and distinct from
physical reality. Data and program are physical, and I think there is
no reason to think they are in fact in some eternal space of data and
programs and not in the physical universe [*].
The distinction I am drawing may seem to be insignificant at first
sight. Nevertheless, it is a distinction I've developed, despite the
rather painful counter-rhetoric of Franzel, in view of Godel's
metaphysics. In my opinion, Platonism necessarily implies a dualist
theory of mind. And even if somebody could argue that is not the case,
Platonism is not a very scientific view of the world.
Therefore, I think we must adapt the Aristotelian Realism which Gödel
tried to discredit as absurd, at some length [+]. The software can be
seen as a physical property, and universal simulation is no doubt
physical, which is the mechanism for multiple realizability. What
could be more physical, for instance, than copying data? It is perhaps
not the philosophy of mathematics that should change, but the
philosophy of physics. The Aristotelian view can divorce computation
from the inseparable duality of Platonism. What is more, this view can
also form a sound basis for digital physics.
In light of the distinction I've drawn, do you prefer a Platonist or
Aristotelian interpretation of the Hardware/Software dichotomy? Or do
you have an alternative explanation?
Regards,
-- Eray Ozkural [!] The wording of this phrase is rather unfortunate. However, the phrase must not be taken literally. [*] This is in fact, the hidden postulate of digital philosophy! [+] I have not fully determined whether psychologism has any merit, yet.
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