Re: Zenkin's paper on Cantor (reply of Dr. Zenkin)

From: Chas Brown (cbrown_at_cbrownsystems.com)
Date: 10/30/04

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    Date: 30 Oct 2004 00:03:08 -0700
    
    

    examachine@gmail.com (Eray Ozkural exa) wrote in message news:<320e992a.0410271136.4479a210@posting.google.com>...
    > Dear Chas,
    >
    > Thanks for your post.
    >
    > cbrown@cbrownsystems.com (Chas Brown) wrote in message news:<ba7dcfd7.0410161641.57a0b26e@posting.google.com>...
    > > examachine@gmail.com (Eray Ozkural exa) wrote in message news:<320e992a.0410150808.6117de6f@posting.google.com>...
    > > > "Plamen Petrov" <ppetrov@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<2t70ugF1s991jU1@uni-berlin.de>...
    > > > > Recently I had a private correspondence with Alexander Zenkin; among many
    > > > > things I brought to his attention *this* thread discussing his publications
    > > > > on Cantor.
    > > > >
    > > > > I am forwarding the following message on behalf of Dr. Zenkin.
    > > > >
    > > > > (You will find most of his comments below marked with "AZ" == "Alexander
    > > > > Zenkin")
    > > >
    > > > Thanks, Plamen. I was almost convinced by Dr. Chapman that Dr. Zenkin
    > > > had made an elementary mistake in the paper, such that we must be
    > > > highly skeptical of it. Dr. Zenkin's explanations make it clear that
    > > > the criticisms were not quite realistic.
    > > >
    > > > Regards,
    > >
    > > Good heavens! Assuming that you are serious in trying to understand
    > > the mathematical basis for Cantor's argument, you could hardly do
    > > worse than to accept his responses as addressing the criticisms that
    > > have been leveled here.
    > >
    > > You should indeed be highly skeptical of this paper; and if you wish
    > > to proceed with your studies of mathematical philosophy, you should
    > > assure yourself of why this skepticism is justified.
    >
    > I wish to proceed with my studies of mathematical philosophy.
    >

    Excellent. It is an interesting field.

    In my opinion, however, mathematical philosophy should not be the
    study of, and exposition on, whatever one _as a philosopher_ thinks
    mathematics is, but what one as a philosopher thinks about what
    _mathematicians_ think mathematics is.

    > The paper is a philosophical one. I cannot myself say I endorse each
    > and every claim, but Zenkin makes criticism, and some of it I find of
    > substance.
    >
    > Some people, like Rob, claimed elementary mistakes in the paper (like
    > that Zenkin says there are only n n-bit bitstrings, rather than 2^n)
    > which was not the case apparently. This would apparently make him a
    > crank.

    In that instance, I think it just makes Zenkin a poor "explainer" -
    but his logical errors are still quite apparent.

    > Anyway, it's a shame if people claimed elementary mistakes
    > where there was none, only because "the guy said Cantor, he must be a
    > crank".
    >

    If one wishes to study, and discourse upon, the operations of a dairy,
    then it would practically fruitless to attempt this without first
    understanding the needs of a dairy farm; and how dairy farmers go
    about their activities.

    Otherwise, the "philosophy of dairys" would resemble a guy at a bar,
    who has never been on a farm, and knows little about a dairy either
    first- or second-hand, saying "Y'know, they ought to feed those cows
    chocolate, then they'd get chocolate milk!".

    You should notice that no credible mathematician here respects the
    _arguments_ made by Zenkin; not because he's a crank, but because they
    fail the test of being about whatever it is that _mathematicians_
    consider mathematics.

    The reason why he's considered a crank is that, by professing to be a
    philosopher of mathematics while displaying an ignorance of
    mathematical logic, he displays the willful ignorance characteristic
    of cranks.

    He sits in a bar and tells the dairy farmer "Feed those cows
    chocolate, I want chocolate milk!"

    > There is one obvious place that Dr. Zenkin does not sound correct. The
    > diagonal method is not the only means to establish a proof of Cantor's
    > theorem that there are more reals than there are natural numbers.
    > Cantor's first proof is an example for this, ...

    Okay. So you know this, which is good. It is the work of a moment
    (okay, maybe a bit more) for a _motivated_ person to discover this
    fact, as you did. For a philosopher of mathematics, one would think
    that this would be a "known fact".

    But, as the saying goes, ignorance is no excuse before the law! If you
    sent Zenkin an e-mail pointing out this gaping error in his
    justification of his arguments, how should he respond? Shouldn't he
    discard this line of argument as invalid? Do you think that you would
    be the first person who had noticed this, and brought it to his
    attention?

    That's one reason to suspect him as a crank - when corrected, cranks
    do not retract their arguments. And it beggars belief to imagine
    someone trained in the history and philosophy of mathematics _not_
    knowing the afore-mentioned fact. Conclusion: Zenkin is a likely
    crank. I will examine his "arguments" below.

    > ...and we can find other
    > proofs which do not necessarily use infinitary reasoning.
    >

    More on "infinitary reasoning" below - but I cannot imagine a
    reasonable definition of "infinitary reasoning" that applies to
    Cantor's proof that the power set of a set cannot be put into
    bijection with that set.

    > He could elaborate his point by arguing that any such proof which does
    > not use infinitary reasoning (which he argues is invalid), must
    > necessarily use abstraction of actual infinity,

    Okay, here's where you should really, _really_ try to understand what
    is different about how mathematicians think about mathematics.

    First, he introduces a term, "infinitary reasoning", _without defining
    it_. He gives what he calls an _example_ of it (his failure to find a
    counterexample); and he then attempts to makes an argument that
    reasoning invalidates Cantor's arument.

    This is like saying "consider the number 5, which is prime. Any number
    which is like 5 I shall call 'fish-like'. Therefore, 2^10001 - 1 is
    'fish-like', and therefore prime". I can't even evaluate this
    argument, because I don't know if 2^10001 - 1 really is 'fish-like',
    let alone verify that being 'fish-like' implies "being prime".

    A mathematician would never accept Zenkin's argument as is, primarily
    because there is no definition given for "infinitary reasoning" that
    allows us to evaluate his (incorrect for other reasons) argument.

    We can only _guess_ whether, for example, he considers the standard
    argument proving that "there is no largest integer" also to be an
    example of "infinitary reasoning". Maybe he thinks that it is, and
    thefore the argument is false; and maybe he thinks it isn't - but
    there's no way we can tell _from his argument_ because he hasn't been
    specific enough in defining what he means by "infinitary reasoning".

    >From the form of his argument, I can _guess_ that "using 'infinitary
    reasoning' to prove proposition P" means that "this proof of
    proposition P involves an unbounded number of steps". That would meet
    the standard definition - a proof must have a _finite_ number of
    steps.

    But the next logical problem is, the proof he demonstrates as
    requiring 'infinitary reasoning' is his own attempt to _refute_
    Cantor's argument by showing the existence of a counterexample - so it
    is _he_ who is using an infinite number of steps in a (failed, for
    still other reasons) attempt to prove the existence of a
    counterexample.

    If he means to say that any proof of P, which can be disproven by a
    proof T which is invalid because it contains an infinite number of
    steps, is then not a valid proof, then he's not going to have a lot of
    valid proofs sitting around. If a proof P is a _valid_ proof, then
    _every_ "disproof" T _must_ be invalid for some reason - that's the
    whole _point_ of "consistency".

    But this all just shows Zenkin doesn't understand Cantor's argument in
    the first place; nor mathematical concerns in general.

    Even if we allowed his "infinitary reasoning" constructions to be
    valid, it _still_ doesn't yield a counterexample. That's the whole
    beauty of Cantor's proof - the existence of a counterexample will
    _always_ be a contradiction, no matter how we construct it. So
    Zenkin's "logic" is invalid for another reason - one unrelated to
    whether or not one accepts the "existence" of an infinite set.

    Since he gives no definition of "infinitary reasoning", and his
    argument is certainly no "mathematical" argument, and really no
    logical argument at all - it all boils down to just his thoughts about
    what bothers him about his own lack of understanding of Cantor's
    results.

    As a "meta-mathematician", he is a man in a bar giving advice to a
    dairy farmer.

    If you want to understand mathematics as _mathematicians_ understand
    it, you don't need to understand why Wiles' proof of Fermat's last
    theorem is true (only a few probably could); but you _must_ get to the
    point where you understand why _no_ mathematician worthy of the name
    would accept Zenkin's arguments.

    > which is a point that
    > might be impossible to settle for two reasons:
    > 1. It might turn out that we are unable to define what "abstraction
    > of actual infinity" is precisely enough, because we do not really know
    > what "abstraction" is,

    It may turn out that you are unable to _agreee_ with how "abstraction
    of actual infinity" is defined, but for a mathematician, there is a
    perfectly satisfactory precise definition: It is equivalent to the
    existence of the set defined by the axiom of infinity.

    You may be thinking that "actual infinity" is "that which cannot be
    completed, made complete", "something bigger than big", "the
    unfathomable". That's fine - but then you're not talking about what
    _mathematicians_ talk about when they talk about "actual infinity",
    and you're therefore you're not doing _mathematical_ philosophy.

    What a mathematician would find relevant is : given the above
    definition, what would we do in the _absence_ of the axiom of
    infinity? Which proofs still hold, and does the result correspond to
    the set of problems that mathematicians are interested in? Does it
    correspond to their intuitions? And, more philosophically, should we
    then as rational beings accept the axiom of infinity or reject it?

    Mathematicians who found the implications of Cantor's approach
    distasteful to their intuitions did not cease doing math. They
    eliminated those axioms and forms of logic which they found did not
    correspond to their intuitions, but they still did what mathematicians
    do - they investigated the logical consequences of their favorite
    assumptions.

    That is not what Zenkin is doing.

    > or because "actual infinity" is illogical (and
    > thus necessarily leads to paradoxes when trying to define its
    > abstraction)

    Without getting into Godel-ish complexities, if it could be "easily"
    proven that the assumption of the axiom of infinity in the standard
    set of axioms caused a contradiction (i.e. was inconsistent), believe
    me, we'd have heard about it.

    Just as dairy farmers work with cows every day, mathematicians work
    with the logical implications of infinity all the time, and have done
    so for years. From a position of humility, I'd think it would be
    unlikely that I'd uncover one.

    Is it possible? Sure, humans are fallible; but an awful lot of
    pitching of hay, filling of feed troughs, and just plain milking was
    done by set theoretic mathematicians in order to assure themselves
    that these foundations lacked any contradicitions. Read a good book on
    axiomatic set theory.

    In any case, to accept that the axiom of infinity created
    contradictions, I'd _still_ have to see it proven - and certainly,
    nothing in Zenkin's paper proves this. If you want to be a
    "meta-mathematician", you should learn to see why that is - why a
    _mathematician_ would reject his paper as hopelessly flawed,
    regardless of whether it has "resonance" to you as a philosopher.

    > 2. One might argue that Cantor's first proof does not contain
    > abstraction of actual infinity.
    >

    >From a mathematical view, one doesn't need the axiom of infinity to
    verify the correctness of Cantor's proof that the power set of a set
    cannot be put into bijection with that set. So that is _not_ why a
    mathematician rejects Zenkin's arguments.

    In the absence of the axiom of infinity, there is the problem of being
    very specific about what you mean by "the naturals" and "the reals",
    when your system lacks an axiom saying that the naturals actually _do_
    exist "as a set", and without assuming that the naturals exist "as a
    set" as part of your argument.

    But that problem is not at all addressed by Zenkin.

    > (I cannot say what I believe about 1, but 2 I disagree with)
    >

    On what basis? If you disagree with 2, but you don't know how you
    would define "abstraction of actual infinity", how can you be possibly
    be doing mathematical philosophy?

    If you want to know "how can mathematicians describe the naturals, as
    a set, without implicitly invoking the axiom of infinity?" then that
    is a reasonable (and interesting) question; but you must expect that,
    to understand the answer, you will need to follow a mathematical
    argument.

    And to learn how to follow a mathematical argument, you should assure
    yourself that Zenkin's argument is logically, irreparably invalid.
    Don't take my word for it; follow his argument and _prove_ it is
    wrong.

    > However, if he can settle the following metamathematical theorem:
    >
    > Any proof of Cantor's theorem either requires infinitary reasoning or
    > abstraction of actual infinity. (Whatever it is!)
    >
    > Then, he would have put forward a much stronger argument.

    That would be trying to "settle" the following theorem:

      Any proof of Cantor's theorem is invalid in the absence of the axiom
    of infinity.

    Then, he would have put forward a stronger, but equally false
    argument.

    As Barbie once said, "Math is hard". To study mathematical philosophy,
    one must also study math. Study why Zenkin is wrong.

    >
    > Regards,

    Cheers - Chas


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