Re: Turing Machines and Physical Computation
From: patty (pattyNO_at_SPAMicyberspace.net)
Date: 11/21/04
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Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2004 19:15:28 GMT
Eray Ozkural exa wrote:
> In this part I might actually agree with Longley! Dolan and others
> miss the whole point! Analytical/synthetic distinction indeed does not
> exist. (And on that point I agree with Quine) Why is this distinction
> relevant? Because saying that "an idea is not a physical thing" is a
> lot like saying that "well, ideas can be purely analytical. analytical
> concepts are DISTINCT from synthetic concepts, so it can be the case
> that an idea is not a physical thing...". Close enough.
An idea is a recognition of a possibility (note it is physical in an
appropriate ontology). Some ideas go on to become implemented (or
stick) in our culture ... the WWW was Tim Berners-Lee's idea at some
point. Now what has "recognition of a possibility" got to do with the
analytical/synthetic distinction again? Nothing, imho.
patty
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