Re: Platonism
From: Eray Ozkural exa (examachine_at_gmail.com)
Date: 11/26/04
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Date: 26 Nov 2004 13:05:31 -0800
Mitch Harris <harrisq@tcs.inf.tu-dresden.de> wrote in message news:<30ope0F33hklmU1@uni-berlin.de>...
> > Godel claimed that there was no distinction. Godel was not naive.
> > Actually, some of his arguments are quite strong. But he was wrong
> > about that, in my opinion, and I also think you can't argue for
> > mathematical platonism without also arguing against a mechanical mind,
> > or arguing for the existence of a mathematical god.
>
> I don't see the "against a mechanical mind" connection.
> As to a god, maybe Einstein's Spinoza's God.
The mathematical God could indeed be the One and the Infinite God in
Spinoza'a metaphysics. (And similar stuff is also in Leibniz), and
since Spinoza is considered a neo-Platonist, I could accept this
remark, accept that I do not know what "neo-Platonist" really means.
It does not seem too far from Godel's ideas. In Godel's world, there
would be a realm of mathematical objects even if our universe happened
to be finite (he has separate arguments for that) No reason why I
should not call that a part of God, but it's probably different from
Spinoza's God, I presume, although there is also some similarity, I
think Godel was careful enough to allow for Spinoza's monism.
Interesting relations that deserve more reflection. In particular,
Godel allows for the possibility that the mind is mechanical, but in
that case something awful happens that upsets the materialists.
Regards,
-- Eray Ozkural
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