Re: Python from Wise Guy's Viewpoint

From: Ray Blaak (rAYblaaK_at_STRIPCAPStelus.net)
Date: 10/31/03 

Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2003 07:24:17 GMT

I just read Alfred Tarski's _The Semantic Conception Of Truth And The
Foundations Of Semantics_. It is rare to read such a clear and carefully
written paper.

My question is this: why is it the case that "there must be true sentences
which are not provable"? Given that Tarski himself says "there exists a pair
of contradictory sentences neither of which is provable", couldn't it be the
case that the most you can say is "I don't know", i.e., I can't prove things
either way?

That is, I cannot decide on the sentence's truth, so for practical purposes I
simply give up.

In particular, Gödel sentences don't seem to have any truth meaning: any
attempt to evaluate them give rises to the cyclical spinning of true then
false then true..., i.e. an infinite loop in practical terms. 

-- 
Cheers,                                        The Rhythm is around me,
                                               The Rhythm has control.
Ray Blaak                                      The Rhythm is inside me,
rAYblaaK@STRIPCAPStelus.net                    The Rhythm has my soul.

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