Re: php session without cookie useage
- From: Erwin Moller <since_humans_read_this_I_am_spammed_too_much@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2005 09:53:01 +0200
Gordon Burditt wrote:
>>> Since web servers don't retain state from page to page, it is up to the
>>> browser or the application to maintain the state if needed. Browsers
>>> can do so with a cookie. Alternatively, if you code the application to
>>> transfer a session key created on login to subsequent pages via a POST
>>> (more secure) or GET, you can maintain state. Each page must be
>>> responsible for checking the validity of the key obtained from the
>>> browser via a cookie or via POST or GET.
>>
>>Hi Michael,
>>
>>I have a question:
>>Why do you say that passing PHPSESSID via POST is more safe than via a
>>COOKIE?
>>
>>Or do you mean that passing the PHPSESSID via POST is more secure than
>>GET?
>
Hi Gordon, thanks for your warning.
I wasn't aware of any round-robin proxies that result in a changed IP-adres
for the same session.
Strange setup... I must say I do not like it.
But that is my problem, not your's of course. :-)
One thing: The fact that many people share the same IP doesn't frustrate the
setup I described. The fact that a SESSION has an IP stored, doesn't mean
that every IP can only be used once.
It is only ment as a way to make sure the IP stays the same during one
session.
But of course, the AOL-members and roundrobin proxies are a real concern.
Thanks for your advise.
:-)
Regards,
Erwin Moller
> I think the OP meant that POST is more secure than GET. GET leaves
> the session ID in stored URLs in the browser history. POST does
> not. Cookies with a duration longer than for a browser session
> also get left around in files, although this is much less obvious
> than leaving it in the browser history. Sessions, however done
> (GET, POST, COOKIE), with a short timeout are less vulnerable to
> spoofing since spoofing an expired session does no good whatever.
>
>>I mean: the request to the webbrowser send the GET, POST and COOKIE, all
>>unencrypted (unless you use shhtp of course), so it all sounds very unsafe
>>to me as far a sessionhijacking goes.
>
> Session hijacking does not have to be done by sniffing the wire.
> It could be done by using the same computer after the original user
> leaves (think about Internet Cafes, or families with less than one
> computer per family member). Thus, session IDs left in browser
> history or cookies that last longer than the session can be read,
> by other users or perhaps by spyware. Browser URLs (including the
> session ID, if done with GET) may get cut-and-pasted into email or
> news posts when the user decides to tell his friends about something
> interesting he found on the web.
>
>>One tip a friend once gave me (Rein Velt) is storing the remote IP-adres
>>(the the client's IP) also in the session, and always compare it before
>>using session. :-)
>
> That may block legitimate users using a round-robin proxy (different
> requests come from different IPs, even including pieces of the same
> page). AOL users would have problems with this, I believe, and
> they aren't the only ones. ISPs can inject proxies into the http
> path without users knowing about it or having to change their browser
> settings. (Router magic to redirect the traffic to go through the
> proxy.)
>
> Some users even PAY for a proxy that uses a compressed protocol
> between the proxy and the user's browser with some add-on software
> ("web accelerators"), although they may not realize that's how it
> works. Decent software for this does not cache pages requiring
> authentication. Nor does it cache https. If someone tries caching
> https, and the user is paying attention, they may notice that the
> certificate is different (that of the proxy, not the site they
> requested) for such a man-in-the-middle attack on https.
>
> The browser may pop up warnings in this situation. How many people
> will notice this? Not very many people noticed when I put up a
> secure site with a home-grown certificate for "Satan, Prince of
> Darkness" with an address in Hell. And this was a prototype
> E-commerce site (none of the order-taking or credit-card charging
> stuff ever got done) I was asking them to check out.
>
> Also, the IP check is less than 100% effective against spoofing:
> office users spoofing each other behind a NAT gateway all may have
> the same public IP, and users of the same proxy have the same IP.
>
> The fact that it's less than 100% effective shouldn't discourage
> you, but the fact that you lock out legitimate users might. If
> it's an intranet application, you may not care that AOL users can't
> use it. If it's an E-commerce site, you (or your employer) may be
> upset to realize you've locked out AOL users from buying from you.
>
> Gordon L. Burditt
.
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